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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DORA BURTON,
Plaintiff and Res-pondent,
vs.

Case No. 7392

J. H. McLAUGHLIN, Administrator
of the Estate of Patrick Henry
McLaughlin, deceased,
Defendant and App,ellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

STATEMENT OF THE F'ACTS

Appellant will designate the parties as plaintiff and
defendant.
All italics a:ppearing in the brief are added.
Patrick Henry McLaughlin died on the 17th day of
May, 1948 and at the time of his death he was a retired
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railroad employee receiving regular monthly retirement
pay. He owned his own home located at 756 West 2nd
South Street, in Salt Lake ·City, Utah. At the rear of
his home was :a very small home which he rented to Jesus
Nonas and the plaintiff at a monthly rental of $12.00.
Patrick Henry McLaughlin vva.s survived by a wife
and eight children. His son, James H. McLaughlin,
was appointed administrator of his father's estate. The
·plaintiff presented the administrator with a claim wherein she claimed $930.00 ''for personal services rendered
deceased from about October 1, 1945 to I\1:ay 17, 1948. ''
The said claim was disallowed by defendant administrator and the plaintiff brought the above entitled action,
which is based on an alleged oral contract of employment,
and alleged that from about October 1, 1945 to May 17,
1948 plaintiff rendered to deceased services of a reasonable value of $930.00, for which she alleges she received
no payment. By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14
and 15) plaintiff all·eges that she rendered the following
serVIces:
"That from about October 1, 1945 until the
death of the said Patrick Henry McLaughlin on or
about May 17, 1948, he w-as sick most of the time,
was weak, nervous and confined to his bed; that
he only got up occasionally, and when he did
it was difficult for him to walk alone, and on said
occasions, plaintiff assisted him to get to and
from the lavatory to shave, and even get over to
a chair to sit down.
''During the entire period of time alleged,
plaintiff made his breakfast almost every morning,
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and during the fall and 'vin ter months, she ea1ne
into his house and made the fire every n1orning,
heated "~ater for him to wash, and made his bed
daily. .She kept the fire alive during the day,
and late in the night until she retired, so that
he w. ould not freeze to death. During the entire
period of time, above stated, she washed and
ironed his clothing, mended his clothes, stockings,
etc. About once a \Yeek at his request, she bathed
him because he was unable to do so himself. - On
one particular occasion during the winter of 19471948, the water pipes froze and she had to go out
and get a plumber, and have the pipes fixed.
'' She paid his miscellaneous bills such as light,
water bills, taxes, etc. from money which he gave
her most every month from his monthly pension
check. She also purchased all of his food and some
comforts of life which he requested, for which he
always gave her money. She cooked most of his
dinners, and prepared most of his luncheons during this entire period of time. Every year she
cleaned the woodwork in the spring and in the
fall; she swept out the house every few days to
make it at least partially liveable.
''On special holidays, such as ~Christmas,
Thanksgiving, Easter, etc., she would cook him a
special dinner on her own stove and bring it to
him, and feed it to him as he was alone. All of
the above mentioned services were rendered by
the plaintiff at the .request of Patrick Henry
McLaughlin during his lifetime and upon his
promise to her repeatedly made, that he would
compensate her for her services rendered.''
The testimony of the plaintiff and defendant conflicts as to whether deceased needed the services which
plaintiff claimed she rendered to deceased, also as to
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whether she rendered service to deceased. There is no
evidence that deceased requested any service, except on
one or two occasions when 1>laintiff was going to the
store deceased asked her to make small purchases of
groceries for him for which he gave her the money.
James McLaughlin testified that his father, Patrick
Henry McLaughlin, was a retired railroad crossing
watchman and that he received a pension (railroad retirement pay) (R. 89); that within the three years prior
to his death he was possessed of stocks and bonds ( R. 89) ;
that witness visited his father frequently, about twice
a month over the past three years (R. 89-90), and that
his father was able to and did care for himself "up_until
the last three or four days before he died" (R. 90) _; that
witness never saw Mrs. Burton render any services for
his father; that his father cooked all of his own meals and
did his own cleaning. For a period of four months (December, 1947, and January, February and March, 1948)
prior to decedent's death in May of 1948, a crossing
watchman and his forty-five or fifty year old wife lived
in the home with Patrick Henry McLaughlin and that the
said woman did the cleaning :and cooking and housekeep:
ing during this period; that the crossing watchman died
in McLaughlin's home about a month before McLaughlin
died (R. 137-139); that McLaughlin was around town
and purchased a liquor permit A!)·ril 19, 1948 (R. 139)
(Exhibit R. 177); that the P·atrick Henry McLaughlin
home was filthy dirty and there was no evidence that
plain tiff ever cleaned the said home ( R. 131, 136, 146,
149 and 152).
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There is no evidence of any continued service to
defendant as claimed by the plaintiff; there are only
fragments of testimony indicating that prior to two
months before the death of the deceased that the plaintiff
had done anything for or on behalf of the defendant.
Such testimony was so inconsistent as to be of no value.
For example, Mrs. Jenkins testified that on one occasion
she saw plaintiff take a tray of food to Mr. McLaughlin's house and that she also saw her take some kindling
wood to Mr. McLaughlin's house; that she (Mrs. Jenkins)
had never been inside of Mr. McLaughlin's house (R. 5Q).
Hyrum Silver testified that he smelled food cooking on
several occasions within about a year's time ·prior to
the death of Mr. McLaughlin (R. 72).
There is no definite testimony as to any ascertainable amount of services rendered; there is no evidence
as to the value of services rendered; there is no evidence
of any promise by deceased, Patrick Henry McLaughlin,
to pay for any services, and there is no evidence of demand for payment for services having been made prior
to the death of Mr. McLaughlin.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH APPELLANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL OF THE
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELOW:

P·OINT I.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTIO·N FOR A NONSUIT.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT MADE ITS FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND AWARDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF WHOLLY FAILED TO PROVE ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF
AND DECEASED AS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF, AND
PLAINTIFF WHO·LLY FAILED TO PRO·VE THAT SHE
RENDERED SERVICES TO DECEASED AS ALLEGED BY
PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO: PROVE THAT SHE
EVER DEMANDED PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ALLEGEDLY RENDERED DECEASED DURING THE LIFETIME OF
DECEASED. THERE IS NO PROOF OF NON-PAYMENT
FOR SERVICES ALLEGEDLY RENDERED TO DECEASED
BY PLAINTIFF. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH
THE CO·URT COULD FIX THE VALUE OF SERVICES IN
THE AMO:UNT AS FOUND AND DECREED BY THE COURT,
OR IN ANY OTHER AMOUNT .

. POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING O·VER DEFENDANT'S O:BJECTION RAYMOND R. BRADY'S TESTIMO·NY
PERTAINING TO MATTERS AND CONVERSATIONS HAD
BETWEEN PATRICK HENRY McLAUGHLIN AND HIS ATTORNEY, MR. BRADY, SUCH MATTERS AND CONVERSATIONS BEING CONFIDENTIAL AS BETWEEN ATTO-RNEY AND CLIENT.

ARGUMENT
Points of Error I and II will be argued together as
they both refer to plaintiff's failure to prove the facts
as alleged; failure to prove a contract, expressed or
implied, for services; failure to prove value of services;
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•

and failure to ·prove non-payment for services alleged
to have been rendered.
By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14) plaintiff
alleges "that from October 1, 1945 until the death of
P:atrick Henry McLaughlin on May 17, 1948, he was sick
most of the time, was weak, nervous and confined to his
bed; he only got up occasionally, and when he did he was
so weak it was difficult for him to walk alone, and on
said occasions, plaintiff assisted him to get to and from
the lavatory, to shave, and even get over to a chair to
sit down.''
There is absolutely no evidence to support these
allegations that McLaughlin was sick and incapacitated
except for not to exceed two months prior to his death.
The only evidence of his incapacity was the testimony
of Mr. Brady and his testimony pertained only to th·e
months of March, April and about fifteen days in May
prior to McLaughlin's death, about twenty-five visits
in all (R. 105), and he does not state that McLaughlin
was incapacitated until about t~o weeks prior to his
death. On the contrary, deceased's son, James ~cLaugh
lin, testified that McLaughlin was not inca~pacitated and
that he cared for himself up until three or four days
prior to his death (R. 135). Also defendant's Exhibit
2, which is a "Utah Liquor ·Control Commission Individual Liquor Permit", issued only to the party named
therein, :and which is signed by Mr. ·McLaughlin (R. 139),
discloses positive evidence that he was u~p and around
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town on Aprill9, 1948, which was less than a month prior
to his death.
Plaintiff by her Bill of Particulars (R. 14) alleges:
''During the entire period of time alleged,
plaintiff made his breakfast almost ·every morning,
and during the fall and winter months, she came
into his house and made the fire every morning,
heated water for him to wash, and made his bed
-daily. She kept the fire alive during the day, and
late in the night until she retired, so that he would
not freeze to death. During the entire period of
time, above stated, she washed and ironed his
clothing, mended his clothes, stockings, etc. About
once a week at his request, she bathed him because
he was unable to do so himself. On one particular
occasion during the winter of 1947-1948, the water
pipes froze and she had to go out and get a
plumber, and hav~ the pipes fixed."
There are only fragments of testimony that plaintiff
cooked breakfast for McLaughlin, except possibly the
last two or three weeks prior to his death. The evidence
is that he cooked his own meals until December, 1947
(R. 90) and that during the months of December, 1947,
J·anuary, February and March, 1948, a certain lady
cooked his meals (R. 135 and 138). There is absolutely
no evidence that plaintiff made a fire every morning
or that she did any of the other things alleged in the
above quoted paragraph, except that on one occasion
just p·rior to Mr. McLaughlin's death Mr. B~ady did
testify that he saw her/ bathe Mr. McLaughlin.
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By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14), plaintiff
alleges:
''She paid his miscellaneous bills such as light,
water bills, taxes, etc. from money which he gave
her most every month from his monthly p~ension
check. She also purchased all of his food and some
comforts of life which he requested, for which he
al\vays gave her money. She cooked most of his
dinners, and prepared most of his luncheons during this entire period of time. Every year she
cleaned the woodwork in the spring and in the
fall; she swept out the house every few days to
make it at least partially liveable."
There is no evidence to support these allegations,
or any of them, except that on one or two occasions, over
a period of one and one-half years she was seen to carry
a tray of food from her house to McLaughlin's house
and on one or two -occasions 1she went to the grocery
store for McLaughlin. ·The fact that the plaintiff did
not clean the house and that it was filthy dirty is

~proven

by the witnesses, Mr. Brady who testified as follows
(R. 131):

''Q. Ray, the house was a pretty dirty place,
wasn't it~
A. Yes, it was, it was terribly dirty.
filthy~

Q.

It was

A.

It was filthy.

Q.

The blankets were

A.

Yes, the blankets were dirty.

dirty~
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Q. The linen-pillow slips-was just filthy?
A. Tha-t's right, it was a terrible situation.

Q. And the floor was dirty and greasy andA.

Yes it was, Mr. Wallace.

Q. Dust on the
A.
ation.

furniture~

Yes, Mr. Wallace, it was a pitiful situ-

Q. It was really a filthy dirty layout, wasn't
1. t Dl•

A.

Yes sir it was.

* * *"

and Mr. James McLaughlin, who testified as follows
(R. 13'6, 137) :

''Q. Was the house kept clean and tidy?
A.

No it wasn't.

Q. What was the condition of the house?
A. It was in terrible condition; it was filthy.
Q.

Was it swept 1

A.

No.

Q.

Was the woodwork kept

A.

No it wasn't.

clean~

Q. Was there any evidence of any housecleaning having been done there f
A.

No there wasn't.

Q.

By anybody 1

A.

No."
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Kathleen Ruddy testified (R. 151-153) that she
visited the McLaughlin house five or six times and that
the hous·e and bedding was very dirty and bore no
evidence of having been cleaned e?Ccept when she cleaned
it.
'' Q. On any of those occasions when you
would visit there was there any evidence of any
housework having been done~

A.

Never except when I did it.''

Theodore Simpson testified (R. 146) :
''Did you go to the home after his (meaning
McLaughlin's) death~
A. Yes sir.

Q. What was the condition of the

home~

A. It was terrible, the same as previously,
1n fact.
Q. Bedding, and so forth, do you know what
was done with that~

A. Yes sir; it was filthy, and we just dumped
it on the floor; we wouldn't even touch it. It was
that dirty and filthy.

Q. It was taken out and
A.

burned~

Yes sir."

Plaintiff further alleges by her Bill of Particulars
(R. 15):
''On special holidays, such as Christmas,
Thanksgiving, Easter, etc., she would cook him a
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special dinner on her own stove and bring it to
him, and feed it to him as he was alone. All of the
above mentioned services were rendered by the
plaintiff at the request of Patrick Henry McLaughlin during his lifetime and upon his promise to
her repeatedly made, that he would compensate
her for her services rendered.''
There is absolutely no evidence to support any one
of these allegations; there is no evidence that McLaughlin
requested any -services from the plaintiff or that deceased
repeatedly or ever promised plaintiff ''that he would
comp~ensate her for her services rendered''; there is no
evidence of any service for hire, and any services, as
shown by fragments of testimony, :a.re only such service
as one good neighbor would render to another without
expectation of remuneration. The statement of Mr.
McLaughlin shows that he considered any kindness
shown to him by plaintiff as mere gratuities.
Mr. Bullough testified (R. 64, 65) :

"Q. Just state what he said, 1n substance,
as you remember it.
A. Then I will put it this way: He wanted
me to make a statement to him before he would
sign that deed and transfer that property, that I
would give consideration to Dora Burton, that
she would be allowed to remain in the house. At
the time I raised the question, I wanted some
stipulation of time because, if I so needed that
'P~roperty, then I didn't want to be bound by a
moral obligation, so I suggested that it would be
at least six months before I would have any use
for the back part of the property where the house
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"~as,

and, for that time, she could remain there,
and that, after we did find occasion where we
needed the room, the space where the little house
was, that I would then give her ample time and
consideration in finding another place to live.
Q. Did Mr. McLaughlin make any response
to that assurance that you gave him~

A. When I told him that I would, that he
had felt I would give her six months or more and
would furnish her due consideration to find a place
to live before I would :ask her to vacate, under
that condition he was willing to sign that deed.
That was part of the condition of him signing
that deed.''
It cannot he determined from the evidence the
amount or value of the services, if any, rendered. Plaintiff testified that she had on other jobs received 75 cents
per hour for gener:al housework and $1.00 per hour for
cleaning woodwork, windows and curtains. This is the
only evidence of any value of services and is unrelated
to any other evidence in this case, and it cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be applied to the fragmentary
evidence introduced in this case to determine that plaintiff·· rendered to McLaughlin services of the value of
$930.00 or of any other determinable value.
To be entitled to judgment against the estate of a
deceased person, whe~e the lips of the principal witness
are sealed by death, the court will scrutinize the evidence
with particular care and ''unless (as the Sup.reme Court
of Utah declares in the case of Van N atts vs. Heywood,
et al, 57 Utah, at p·age 381) under the circumstances
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·the proof is positive and clear and convincing, the relief
sought should and will be denied.''
In the case at bar more than three years passed
during Mr. McLaughlin's lifetime and no demand for
payment was ever made upon him during his lifetime.
In the case of Ratliff v. Sadler, et .al, 299 P. 674,
at the bottom of page 676 the court says:
''But where a claim for services or board is
first made after the decease of the alleged debtor,
the presumption obtains that payment was made
or that it was not intended to demand payment,
and evidence to establish a claim for services
-against a decedent's estate not made during his
lifetime, must be other than mere loose declarations and must clearly and distinctly establish a
contract between claimant and decedent."
The true rule of law applicable to this case is expressed in 24 ·Corpus Juris 279 as follows:
'·'·Compensation cannot be allowed for services
which were p~erformed without any claim for payment during decedent's lifetime, or -any expectation of being paid specifically therefor, and without any ·express or implied promise of remuneration, even though their performance may have
been prompted by the hope of obtaining a gift
or legacy which has not been fulfilled ; and a
direction on the part of decedent to his executors
to pay for services voluntarily rendered to decedent will not create a claim against the estate, nor
will the expression by decedent of intention to
pay therefor have this effect."
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Plaintiff evidently bases her claim for services on
an hourly wage of 75 cents or $1.00 per hour (R. 123-6) ..
It cannot be determin·ed how many hours she claims to
have w··orked. It is disclosed by the evidence that
McLaughlin ""'as possessed with bonds and stocks p·rior
to his death and that he received monthly retirement
pay as a retired railroad employee (R. 89). Therefore,
the proof shows that he ""'as able to pay for services.
It would not be natural for a person working· by the
hour to work from October 1, 1945 to May 17, 1948 without being paid or without even demanding pay for her
services. The presumption under thes·e circumstances
is that she was either paid or that no pay was exp·ected
or payable to her.
•

In Hoefner v. Franklin Trust Co., 24 A. (2d) 457,
147 Pa. Super, 404 (Penn. 1942) the court said:
''In determining whether a claimant for wages
alleged to be due for domestic services and nursing furnished decedent discharged the burden of
}}roof, record is to be reviewed with greatest
suspicion, all doubts as to sufficiency of evidence
are to be resolved in favor of estate. The presumption grows stronger as each period of payment goes by. In the nature of things, it is less
potent against a claim for two or three months
wages than for two or three years; and again its
strength is increased or diminished by other circumstances that, in the usual experiences of life,
make payment more probable, or explain the
delay. And the evidence to sustain the claim must
vary in the same ratio. As was said by our late
brother Clark in Gregory v. Com. 121 Pa. 611,
15 A. 452. The presumption will gather strength
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with each succeeding year, and evidence to overthrow it must, of course, be correspondingly
increased. ''
In Bancroft Probate Practice, Vol. 3, page 1534,
it is stated:
''Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Necessary.
"One of the most common of contested claims
against the estate of a decedent is that for services
rendered or supp·ort furnished to decedent in his
lifetime, for which the decedent is said to have
made some manner of vague promise of payment
or re~ompense. The courts are, with reason, suspicious of this class of claims. It is frequently
said that the facts urged in support of such a
demand should be scrutinized with care, or that
the claim must be supported by reliable and convincing proof, or clear convincing-proof, or proof
that is strong and convincing.
''It has been declared that the test of sufficiency of evidence to warrant a recovery on such
a claim is higher than in ordinary actions.''
This s-ame rule has been held by our Supr.eme Court
in the case of Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, near the
bottom of page 529 the court said :

'' * * * While a bill for services alleged to have
been rendered to an old person for a considerable
time before· death without collecting on account
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or without anything in writing to ~how the agreement, or without showing that any demand had
ever been made on the one cared for and what the
outcome of that demand was should be carefully
scrutinized before allowance by the executor.* * * ''

In Anderson v. Distler, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 674, 173
Misc. 261, the court stated :
''The law does not imply a p·romise to pay for
every volunteered service. General assumpsit
cannot be based on a service rendered· through
kindnes-s or other motive and not to be accounted
for on a theory of an expectation of payment."
In Hinkle v .. Sage, 65 N. E. 999, the court stated:
''~Cases

of this kind are odious and are not
favored by the court because they afford an opportunity for fraud against the estates of deceased
persons, and great temptation to perjury.''

In the case of In re Gutekunst Estate, 9 Som. 179,
it is stated:
''In order to establish a claim against the
estate of a decedent the proofs must be direct
and positive and the terms of the liability must
be certain and definite.''
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTIN·G OVER DEFENDANT'S O·BJECTION RAYMOND R. BRADY'S TESTIMONY
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PERTAINING TO MATTERS AND CO:NVERSATIONS HAD
BE_TWEEN PATRICK HENRY McLAUGHLIN AND HIS ATTORNEY, MR. BRADY, SUCH MATTERS AND CONVERSATIONS BEING CONFIDENTIAL AS BETWEEN ATTO·RNEY
AND CLIENT.

Mr. Brady was Mr. McLaughlin's attorney, prepared
his will for him (R. 117) and the court, over defendant'a
objection, permitted Mr. Brady to testify pertaining to
matters and conversations which w·ere confidential as
between attorney and client (R. 114-121). This was
prejudicial error and in violation of the p·rovisions of
Subsection 2 of Sec. 104-49-3, Utah ·Code Annotated, 1943,
which provides as follows:
''An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
therein, in the course of professional employment;
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer or
clerk be examined, without the consent of his·
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of
which had been acquired in such capacity.''
The conversation (R. 119-120) clearly shows the
relationship of :attorney and client and the conversation
admitted in evidence pertained to the preparation of a
will and codicil, and as such was confidential and should
not have been admitted in evidence.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred when it denied the Motion for Nonsuit, :also when
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it entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L·aw
and Decree, as there was no evidence, or in any event
insufficient evidence, upon which to base the Findings
of Fact and Decree. The court further erred when it
admitted in evidence the confidential conversations had
between the deceased and his attorney.
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
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